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Abstract
In this paper we suggest a set of indicators about the future performance of the Spanish public
pension system and a suitable method of representing their uncertainty, in order to improve the
communication to the public opinion about its main future challenges. Spain seems a particularly
interesting case in Europe to illustrate our proposals, since the social security system has been in
surplus for nine consecutive years, in sharp contrast to the projections made just a decade ago, but,
atthesametime, mostprojectionsforeseeforSpainoneofthehighestincreasesinpublicexpenditure
among EU countries due to ageing. We argue that simple, transparent, credible, public and periodic
indicators, which take explicitly into account the uncertainty about future demographic, economic
and institutional developments, may contribute to improve the debate on the policies needed to
strengthen the pension system.
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1. Introduction
Most countries, industrialized and emerging ones, make projections of their main public
revenue and expenditures. In some cases, these projections respond to institutional com-
mitments with supranational institutions (for example, in the case of the EU countries,
with the European Commission). However, in most of them public ﬁnances projections
￿ We would like to thank A. Durán for providing some of the data and the helpful comments of G. Follette and
the participants at the 10th Banca d’Italia Workshop on Public Finance Fiscal Sustainability: Analytical Developments
and Emerging Policy Issues, Perugia 3-5 April 2008. The views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the
authors and do not reﬂect the opinions of their institutions. R. Doménech also thanks the support of project
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are the natural outcome of responsible governments who try to anticipate their future chal-
lenges in terms of sustainability faced by their budgets, as well as to evaluate the impact
of potential reforms.
Duringthelastdecades, therehasbeenanoutstandingprogressinforecastingmeth-
ods, thanks to new theoretical and empirical models, to the diffusion of databases and to
the availability of more powerful and efﬁcient computation techniques. A particularly
rich area of research has been related to ageing projections and its impact on budgetary
balance and agents’ behaviour. The consensus reached within the academic community
on the need of social security reforms has not sufﬁciently fostered a public debate on their
alternatives. This imbalance can be explained by, at least, two factors. First, it may reﬂect
a signiﬁcant lack of knowledge among non-specialists about the progresses in the litera-
ture on these topics, probably due to an overly technical presentation of the results. Most
of the surveys conﬁrm this assumption. Secondly, many policy makers and citizens share
a high degree of scepticism about long-term projections of the public pension system.
Theempiricalevidenceshowsclearlythatthelackofknowledgeaboutveryrelevant
features of the welfare state is a serious problem in many advanced economies. For exam-
ple, Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001) surveyed population from France, Germany,
Italy and Spain on their welfare states (mainly on unemployment beneﬁts and pension
systems) and on various reform options, and showed that the overall degree of misin-
formation about the pension system was undoubtedly high. Between 21.0 per cent (Ger-
many) and 50.8 (Spain) per cent of respondents did not know how much of their wage
was devoted to pay for public pensions (see Figure 1). The Spanish case is particularly
troublesome. The percentage of non respondents is the highest among the four countries.
And, among those who answered, the proportion who knew the number approximately
right is the lowest (28 per cent vs. 64 per cent in Italy). In sum, less than 14 per cent
of Spaniards knew the social security contribution rate, which represents half of the ﬁg-
ure in France, and one third of the Italian one. Overall, results show that people tend to
ignore or underestimate the costs of public pension system. Additionally, Boeri, Börsch-
Supan and Tabellini (2002) asked Germans and Italians about how their pension systems
worked. Only 40.5 per cent realized that, as the pay-as-you-go principle states, all their
contributions ﬁnance current pension expenditures, not their future beneﬁts (59.5 per cent
thought that part of their contributions went into a pension fund). Similar ﬁgures were
obtained for Italy by Boeri and Tabellini (2005). And, given the track record, in the best
scenario French and Spanish ﬁgures would have been probably not lower. In spite of it,
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Figure 1: Knowledge about the pension contribution rate. Data source: Boeri,
Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001).
Herce and Pérez-Díaz (1995) showed for Spain. This case seems particularly important. In
1995, after agreeing on the challenges of the public pension system, and on the basic lines
of reform, all the political parties in Spain also agreed not to debate on pension issues dur-
ing the political campaigns before elections, in order to avoid populist approaches. Since
then, the public debate is limited to social dialogue and to a parliament permanent com-
mission. Survey shows that 58 per cent of respondents considered that this agreement was
negative. In a similar line, Blinder and Krueger (2004) show, based on a survey in the US,
that only 3 per cent of people consider that being well informed about major economic
policy issues is not important.
This lack of information about the pension system is one of the reasons behind the
scarce debate and support for a reform agenda in many countries, even in those facing sig-
niﬁcant future challenges due to ageing. In fact, recent evidence shows that the political
support for reforms increases (or, at least, their opposition decreases), as long as the pro-
jections and the reforms are well explained to and understood by citizens, irrespectively
of their age (and, therefore, overcoming the consequences of the ageing of the median
worker). An illustrative case is the 2007 Europe-wide Deliberative Poll.2 In October 2007,
more then 350 people from the 27 countries of the EU debated on economic, social and
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foreign policy issues at the European Parliament during three days. One of the topics
referred to the public pension system, its prospects and reform scenarios. Initially, two
thirds of participants opposed to raise the retirement age (vs. 26 per cent who favoured
this reform, and 8 per cent who neither favoured nor opposed). After three days of dis-
cussions and seminars with independent experts on the issue, the opposition to raising
the retirement age (the most effective alternative according to all the empirical studies and
the most unpopular one according to several surveys) was reduced 24 points (of which,
21 points thanks to a reduction of people who opposed strongly), down to 42 per cent
(Figure 2). Therefore, after gathering information about the situation and the prospects of
the pension systems in Europe, there were almost as many favourers (40 per cent) as op-
ponents.3 Boeri and Tabellini (2005) found similar results in the case of Italian citizens.
The willingness to accept reforms that reduce its generosity (such as raising the retirement
age and cutting pension beneﬁts), was signiﬁcantly higher among individuals who were
more informed about the costs, sustainability and basic functioning of the Italian pension
system (precisely, about its ﬁnancial current position, the pay-as-you-go functioning and
the social security tax rate)4. Besides, Chan and Stevens (2008) highlighted that the re-
tirement behaviour is directly related to individual’s level of knowledge (in particular, to
ﬁnancial incentives). Moreover, Boeri and Tabellini (2005) pointed out that governments
should make an effort to spread this information, since media coverage by itself may not
be enough. Individuals who had read newspaper articles or watched TV debates on the
Italian pension reform were not signiﬁcantly better informed.
Summarizingtheprecedingliterature, theempiricalevidenceshowsthat, ﬁrst, there
is a signiﬁcant lack of knowledge on key features of the pension system and, second, that
the support for reforms is higher among more informed citizens. For all these reasons,
economists should be encouraged to improve their communication strategies in order to
increase the society’s understanding of the implications of ageing on government bud-
gets. A ﬁrst starting point would be to agree on a common set of indicators on the social
security outlook, based on some general requirements, such as transparency and simplic-
3 In Spain, according to Pérez-Diaz and Rodríguez (2007), opposition to this measure among the population
50-70 years old reaches 55 per cent (vs. 32 per cent of favourers and 13 per cent who do not answer). In 1996, this
proportion reached 71 per cent in 1996 (vs. 22 per cent who agreed and 8 per cent of non respondents). However,
it may be optimistic to attribute these results to a better knowledge, since the percentage of people who do not
answer if pension levels would be sustainable in the next 15 years remain very high (37 per cent in 2006, vs. 34
per cent in 1996).
4 Results about the knowledge on pension issues were also discouraging. Only half of the respondents knew
how a pay-as-you-go scheme basically worked, and just 10 per cent were close to the legal social security tax rate
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Figure 2: Opinions on pension reform before and after deliberations.
ity. Secondly, conﬁdence intervals of projections should be made explicit in order to avoid
that any future deviation from the baseline scenario justiﬁes inaction.
The basic aim of this paper is to suggest a set of appropriate indicators and a suit-
able method of representing their uncertainty to improve the communication strategies to
the public opinion, taking the Spanish public pension system as workhorse. This choice
is particularly interesting for several reasons. First, the social security system has been in
surplus for nine consecutive years, in sharp contrast to the projections made just a decade
ago. These projection errors are a frequent line of reasoning to avoid the discussion about
the future of the system and the convenience of possible improvements. Secondly, the
Spanish economy has beneﬁt from an unpredicted and outstanding supply shock, due to
immigrationﬂowsand to higherfemalelabourparticipation, withunambiguouseffects on
the current social security surplus (see, among others, Economic Bureau of the Prime Min-
ister, 2006). However, despite the favourable current situation, most projections predict
that Spain will face one of the highest increases in public expenditure among EU countries
due to ageing. Therefore, it may be a right time to foster a debate on the reform agenda,
given that in the last decade the discussion about the challenges of the Spanish system
has been less far-reaching than in other European economies, notably Germany, Italy or
Sweden (see Economic Bureau of the Prime Minister, 2007 and OECD, 2007).PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 6
The paper is organized as follows. In the second section, we brieﬂy present the
aggregate accounting methodology, the data and the assumptions for an updated projec-
tion of the public pension system in Spain, up to 2060. In the third section we report
the main results for plausible alternative scenarios and compare them with recent studies,
highlighting the main sources of uncertainty that involves this projection (demography,
socio-economy and institutions). Also in light of these sources of uncertainty, this section
ends with an analysis of the observed deviations from the projections made in the mid
nineties. In the fourth section we describe and present a set of indicators of the medium
and long-term outlook of the pension system, both for the baseline and the alternative
scenarios used to asses the uncertainty in the baseline. These indicators may be used to
improve the communication strategy on the challenges of the pension system. Finally, we
present the main conclusions.
2. The projection methodology
2.1 Methodology description: Aggregate accounting
In the paper we use the aggregate or growth accounting approach to obtain the projections
oftheSpanishpensionexpenditure. Thismethodologyhasalongtraditionintheliterature
and, with some variations on the aggregation of the different variables used (mainly due
to various pension categories, and sex and age of workers and pensioners), is followed
by most social security administrations. Additionally, the CBO’s Long-Term Actuarial
Model and the Ageing in charge of the public expenditure projections in the European
Commission, follow this approach.
The aggregate or growth accounting approach relies on different assumptions at the
economy as a whole about future trends in demography (fertility rates, migration ﬂows
and life expectancy), in economic conditions (participation and employment rates, pro-
ductivity, wages and interest rates) and in institutional factors (coverage and pension lev-
els).
The main advantage of this method is that, based on the projections of a relatively
small number of variables, it is simple to obtain reasonable projections of the pension ex-
penditure as a share of output. Projections based on individual life-cycle proﬁles produce
a richer amount of information for different generations, making possible to obtain indi-
vidual accounts and the analysis of the distributional effects of alternative policies, but
at the cost of more complexity. As an alternative to these two methods, general equilib-
rium models have the advantage of accounting for the endogeneity of some of variablesPROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 7
as, for example, the labour supply, which is assumed to be exogenous in the aggregate
accounting approach or in the individual life-cycle proﬁles.5 The main drawback of gen-
eral equilibrium models is that the results are sensitive to many more assumptions and
hypothesis, since there are more exogenous parameters that need to be calibrated. Given
that these alternative methods produce similar conclusions about the challenges of the
pension system, we have opted for the simplicity of the aggregate accounting approach.
The ﬁrst step in the aggregate accounting method is to decompose the share of GDP



































the nominal expenditure and Ptthe price level), and GDPt/Lt the average real labour pro-
ductivity. The second term in the right-hand side of equation (1) is usually named the
beneﬁt ratio, since it relates the average pension to labour productivity.
Equation (1) implies that the share of GDP devoted to pensions is explained by de-
mographic, institutional and macroeconomics factors, since L
pens
t /Lt depends on demo-











on the macroeconomic performance (labour productivity).



























that is, the coverage of the pension system), the old-age dependency ratio (L+65
t /L16￿64
t ),
the inverse of the participation rate (L16￿64
t /Ls
t) and the inverse of 1 minus the unemploy-
ment rate.
Combining equations (1) and (2) we can obtain a convenient decomposition of pen-
5 Jimeno, Rojas and Puente (2008) offer an excellent survey of the features of these alternative methods and
perform a quantitative analysis for the Spanish pension system.PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 8

































To sum up, in order to make the aggregate accounting method operational we only
need projections of the different terms in the right-hand side of equation (3).
2.2 Data description
Demographics
In the long run, results are mainly driven by the demography. In order to deal with the
uncertainty that surrounds it (mostly due to immigration ﬂows, as well as fertility rates
and life expectancy), we use three demographic scenarios. As shown in Table 1, the cen-
tral scenario (named Demo 2) corresponds to the new demographic projection recently
published by Eurostat, Europop20086 for further details (Eurostat, 2008). We also used
the companion Eurostat’s demographic projection that assumes zero net immigration, as
scenario Demo 1. Finally, we constructed a more favourable scenario (Demo 3) based on
the previous round of demographic projections published by INE in 2005 (in particular,
we chose INE’s scenario 1). Since immigration stocks and immigration ﬂows were largely
underestimated, series can not be taken directly. The ﬁgures for 2006 are taken from the
population statistics of the Spanish Labour Force Survey (EPA), and, from 2007, we apply,
disaggregated by sex and age (16-24 years, 25-54 years, 55-64 years, and over 64), the an-
nual changes projected from 2003. In some sense, this exercise assumes that population
developments from 2007 will be in line with those projected from 2003, but corrected by
the errors stemming from the unexpected population shock between 2003 and 2007.
The different old-age dependency ratio projections (L+65
t /L16￿64
t ) are represented in
Figure 3. The ratio will signiﬁcantly increase from 0.24 in 2006 to 0.53-0.70 in 2060. The
results show that even considering high immigration ﬂows (4.4 million people between
2007 and 2014 in the central scenario, Demo2, and between 100 and 200 thousand per year
6 These series are in line with the latest ofﬁcial projections by the Spanish National Institute of Statistics (INE,
2008), available up to 2015, and will be used for the on-going round of public expenditure projections of the
Ageing Working Group. See population projections in epp.eurostat.ex.europa.eu for further details (Eurostat,
2008).PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 9
Table 1. Main projection assumptions
Table 1. Main projection assumptions
Demographic scenarios
Demo 1 Eurostat (2008): Europop2008 zero immigration
Demo 2 Eurostat (2008): Europop2008
Demo 3 Own elaboration, based on INE (2005)
Socio-economic scenarios
Macro 1 Constant participation rates from 2010
Constant unemployment rates from 2010
Macro 2 2006 Swedish participation rates in 2030
2006 US unemployment rates in 2030
Macro 3 2006 Swedish participation rates in 2060
2006 US unemployment rates in 2060
Institutional scenarios
Institut 1 Pension increases over productivity (13%, as 1996-2006)
Institut 2 Constant benefit ratio from 2030
Institut 3 Pension decreases over productivity (-13%)
Common assumptions
Short-term macroeconomic scenario 2007-2010: Stability programme
Cyclical economic and other uncertainty (+/- 0,4 p.p. approx.)
Productivity growth: 1,5 per cent from 2015
Convergence to unitary take-up ratio in 2060
Constant social contributions over GDP from 2006
afterwards), Spain will experiment an intense ageing process (among the highest of indus-
trialized economies). Ceteris paribus, based on equation (3), public pension expenditure
over GDP in 2060 could be between 2.2 and 3.1 times higher than in 2006.
Socio-economics
Participation and unemployment rates are projected separately for women and men, and
for the same four age groups (16-24 years, 25-54 years, 55-64 years, and over 64; the age for
entering into the labour market is legally set at 16 years in Spain). From 2007 to 2010, we
use the employment growth projections of the Ministry of Treasury (2007)7. From 2011,
we deﬁne three alternative scenarios. In Macro 1 participation and unemployment rates
by age and sex are kept constant. Therefore, all the variations are purely demographical.
7 Employment growth is projected in terms of Labour Force Survey statistics. In recent years, there has been a
signiﬁcant deviation of these ﬁgures with respect to National Accounts employment data (employment growth
in Spain has been, between 1996 and 2006, 0.9 p.p. per year higher according to Labour Force Survey than to
National Accounts). We assume that the gap between the respective rates of change is null from 2015. This issue
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Figure 3: Dependency ratio (L+65/L16￿64), 1996-2060. Source: INE and Eurostat.
By contrast, in the central scenario Macro 2, participation and unemployment rates are
projected to converge linearly in 2060 to the participation rates (by age and sex) observed
in Sweden in 2006 (approximately 80 per cent in the aggregate), and to the unemployment
rates observed in the US in 2006 (close to 4 per cent). Finally, the Macro 3 scenario antic-
ipates this real convergence process to 2030, keeping the rates of each sex and age group
constant afterwards.
In addition, annual productivity growth (measured as GDP over National Accounts
employment) is taken from the Stability Program up to 2010, and it is set exogenously at
1.5 per cent from 2011 for workers over 16 years (labour productivity of workers aged
16-64 will be higher, depending on the demographic projections).
Finally, we include a factor to control for the short-term economic uncertainly, com-
mon to the three scenarios. Its size is based on the observed volatility of output in Spain in
the last decades, and implies a conﬁdence interval around expenditure ﬁgures of around
0.3-0.4 percentage points (p.p.) over the whole projection period8.
Institutional features
There is a signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty on some institutional issues, even applying
8 95 per cent conﬁdence interval, based on the standard error of Spanish output gap (0.0226), estimated with a
model based on the Kalman ﬁlter as explained in Doménech and Gómez (2006), with quarterly data for 1970Q1-
2008Q1. We would like to thank Glenn Follette, for suggesting this point.PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 11
the usual no policy change rule. The average pension depends not only on the evolution
of productivity, but also on each afﬁliate’s labour market history (for example, the length
and temporal distribution of contribution and non-contribution periods, and the effective
retirement age). As in the previous items, to deal with these variations we deﬁne three
scenarios. From 2030, in our central scenario (Institut 2) real average pension grows at the
same rate than labour productivity of workers aged 16-64, so that the beneﬁt ratio is kept
constant. However, during the period 1996-2006, the rate of growth of the average pension
has been a 13 per cent higher than that of productivity (1.9 per cent vs. 1.7 per cent).
Therefore, in Institut 1 scenario, the average pension growth rate from 2030 will be a 13
per cent higher than productivity growth, so the beneﬁt ratio increases. In order to design
a balanced exercise, in Institut 3 pension grows below productivity. The range is set so
that the negative growth gap has the same size than the positive in the previous scenario
(13 per cent). In the three of them, a transition period is set from 2007 to 2030, so that
annual changes converge from the 1996-2006 average (1.9 per cent) to the corresponding
rate in each case. In terms of the number of pensions, we assume a linear convergence
to a unitary take-up ratio in 2060, common for the three institutional scenarios. In both
cases, the central assumptions are also in line with the latest ofﬁcial exercises (Ministerio
de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2005 and Economic Policy Committee, 2006).9
The projections are based on a quite rigorous institutional framework that compen-
sates some of the drawbacks of aggregate accounting. The projection will be focused on
the so-called contributory public pension system, that is, we exclude the solidarity pillar and
the voluntary one. In the expenditure side, we will project aggregate public contributory
pensions, which comprise permanent disability, old-age, early retirement and survivors
beneﬁts. Therefore, some contributory beneﬁts are not considered, such as unemployment
beneﬁts (managed outside the social security system and ﬁnanced by its speciﬁc contribu-
tions), and temporary disability and maternity (which are usually projected constant over
GDP). Additionally, we take into account that in 2012, the separation of social security ﬁ-
nancing sources (social contributions and transfers from central government) should be
completed. Therefore, non-contributory beneﬁts will be fully ﬁnanced by general rev-
enues, and not by social security contributions (in 2006, two thirds of the complement of
minimum pensions, which represent 0.5 per cent of GDP, were ﬁnanced by social contri-
butions). This fact impacts the pension fund, as it will be described later on. Revenue
ﬁgures are compatible with this selective approach. We will just include social security
9 The detailed assumptions of the Spanish projection, and some sensibility tests, can be found in Gil, López,
Onrubia, Patxot and Souto (2007).PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 12
contributions that are devoted to ﬁnance speciﬁcally these contributory pensions10. From
2007, social contributions are set constant over GDP.
We also include the pension reserve fund established in Spain in 2000. By law (Gen-
eral Act on Budgetary Stability), the major part of social security administration surplus
has to be saved in this fund. In particular, the surplus is calculated excluding the part of
minimum contributory pensions that is ﬁnanced by general revenues (one third in 2006,
100 per cent from 2012). In each scenario, this rainy-days fund will be accumulated and
capitalized at a common nominal 5.5 per cent rate (3.5 per cent in real terms). This rate of
return is higher than the observed return from 2000 (4.2 per cent in nominal terms), but
close to European Commission assumptions in its Ageing Reports (5 per cent in nominal
terms, 3 per cent in real terms).
Finally, we should add two caveats. Firstly, although assumptions have been ex-
plained separately for exposition purposes, they are not independent. For instance, a
more favourable demographic scenario may affect participation and employment rates
(since high employment cohorts are more numerous). Secondly, we should stress that we
do not consider explicitly the effects of the 2007 social security reform (Ley de Medidas en
Materia de Seguridad Social, effective since January, 2008). Brieﬂy, the reform makes the con-
ditions for early retirement stricter (in particular, for partial retirement, it increases from
15 to 30 the required years of contribution and from 60 to 61 years the minimum age), and
strengthens the ﬁnancial incentives to work over 65 (extending the two per cent bonus in
pensions for each year to all contributory afﬁliates, and setting a three per cent bonus if the
afﬁliate has contributed for more than 40 years). Additionally, the minimum contribution
period is increased across the board, due to the exclusion in the contribution history of ex-
tra payments. A transition period, up to 2012-2015 depending on the measure, is set. In
net terms, we would expect an slight increase of social security taxes over GDP, and a de-
crease of expenditure, mostly thanks of a higher effective retirement age, so sustainability
indicators might improve.
10 In Spain, there is no legal imputation of social security contributions by expenditure categories. However,
Spanish social security administration has elaborated an estimate for the year 2006 within the Task Force on the
statistical measurement of the assets and liabilities of pension schemes in general government (see Committee
on Monetary, Financial and Balance of Payments Statistics, 2008). According to it, 88 per cent of total social
contributions revenues can be imputed to the pension system (8.6 per cent of GDP).PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 13
3. Results
3.1 Pension expenditure scenarios, Spain 2006-2060
Combining the three different sets of assumptions on demography (scenarios Demo 1,
Demo 2 and Demo 3), on socio-economics (scenarios Macro 1, Macro 2 and Macro 3) and
on institutional design (scenarios Institut 1, Institut 2 and Institut 3), as many as 27 projec-
tions can be made, covering almost all the reasonable future developments of the old-age
dependency ratio, the participation and unemployment rates, and the beneﬁt ratio.
In Figure 4, we have represented a sub-set of these scenarios. The central scenario
is elaborated taken scenarios Demo 2, Macro 2 and Institut 2. The ﬁrst interval shows how
the central scenario is affected by a worse or better demographic scenario (Demo 1 and
Demo 3) respectively. The conﬁdence interval widens further when we take into account
the uncertainty about future participation and unemployment rates (Macro 1 and Macro
3, respectively). The third interval is obtained after allowing for a more or less generous
institutional design, in terms of the pension level over productivity (scenarios Institut 1
and Institut 3, respectively). Finally, the fourth interval adds the aforementioned short-
term economic or cyclical uncertainty, completing the range.11
A ﬁrst conclusion from Figure 4 is that demographic assumptions (particularly af-
fected by immigration ﬂows) are the most important source of uncertainty. The second
conclusion is that, despite their relatively wide dispersion, results are quite robust: Spain
will experiment a signiﬁcant increase in public pension expenditure in the following ﬁve
decades. And, within all the plausible described assumptions, the system will be in red at
some point of the next three decades.
Uncertainty obviously increases over time, as the different areas from central sce-
nario illustrate. In the central scenario, the system would be in red in 2024. Demographic
uncertainty suggests that the ﬁrst deﬁcit could occur between 2021 and 2026. If we add the
macroeconomic uncertainty, the interval should be augmented to 2020-2029. The impact
of different pension rules would augment this interval to 2020-2031. Finally, short-term
uncertainty suggest that the system could be in red between 2018 and 2035. It is inter-
esting to note that, given the quantitative assumptions described in the previous section,
11 Notice that, by construction, in Figure 4 we have added the uncertainty associated to each scenario. The
advantage of this approach is that allows us to obtain a very clear and comprehensible image of the quantitative
relevance of the different assumptions we have made. The transparency of results in Figure 4 is at the cost
of statistical inference, which cannot be assessed. Nevertheless, to the extent that our intervals of the old-age
dependency ratio, the participation and unemployment rates, and the beneﬁt ratio are sufﬁciently wide to be
consistent with the empirical evidence of the last decades, we are reasonably secured against future development
of these variables.PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 14
























Figure 4: Public pension expenditure projections, 1995-2060 (GDP share). The
central scenario is surrounded by the intervals that reﬂect the uncertainty in the
demography, the labour market, the beneﬁt ratio and the business cycle.
uncertainty sources seem to have a similar quantitative impact on projections.
This graphical approach shares the spirit of fan charts, very popular for inﬂation
forecasts (see, for example, Cogley, Morozov and Sargent, 2005). The main difference is
that intervals are not based on probabilistic inference, but on different sets of economic
and institutional assumptions. We will come back to this point in section four.
The range of the numerical results is shown in more detail in Table 2 and Figure 5.
Although it is not the main contribution of this paper, nevertheless it could be useful to
describe the results of the central scenario depicted in Figures 4 and 512. Pension expendi-
ture could increase up to 15.3 per cent of GDP in 2060, from 7.6 per cent in 2006, doubling
its share on output (see Table 2). This evolution is mainly driven by the increase of the
number of pensions over workers (0.45 to 0.86), due to the ageing of population (depen-
dency ratio more than doubles, up to 0.60). The decrease of the take-up ratio and a higher
employment rate (thanks to the increase of participation and the decrease of unemploy-
12 For exposition reasons, Figure 5 does not include the short-term economic uncertainty factor. As usual,
results for the different projections are available upon request.PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 15
Table 2. Public pension expenditure projection, 2006-2060.
Expenditure Benefit ratio
GDP share Take-up Dependency
ratio ratio (Gpens/P*Lpens) /
Gpens/P*GDP Lpens / L Lpens / L+65 L+65/L16-64 L16-64/LS 1 / (1-u) (GDP/L)
Central scenario
2006 7,6% 0,45 1,14 0,24 1,50 1,09 0,17
2015 8,1% 0,46 1,11 0,27 1,46 1,08 0,17
2030 10,7% 0,61 1,08 0,36 1,47 1,07 0,18
2045 15,4% 0,87 1,04 0,56 1,42 1,06 0,18
2060 15,3% 0,86 1,00 0,60 1,39 1,04 0,18
High expenditure scenario
2006 7,6% 0,45 1,14 0,24 1,50 1,09 0,17
2015 8,7% 0,48 1,11 0,28 1,41 1,09 0,17
2030 13,1% 0,71 1,08 0,41 1,48 1,09 0,18
2045 21,7% 1,16 1,04 0,71 1,45 1,09 0,18
2060 22,4% 1,16 1,00 0,74 1,45 1,09 0,19
Low expenditure scenario
2006 7,6% 0,45 1,14 0,24 1,50 1,09 0,17
2015 7,3% 0,44 1,11 0,26 1,42 1,07 0,17
2030 8,7% 0,53 1,08 0,34 1,39 1,04 0,17
2045 12,2% 0,76 1,04 0,50 1,40 1,04 0,16
2060 12,5% 0,79 1,00 0,53 1,42 1,04 0,16
Notes:  Expenditure figures include minimum pensions complement
High and low expenditure scenarios incorporate +/- 0.4 p.p., due to short-term economic uncertainty
Source: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales and own elaboration
Pensions / Workers
Employment rate
ment rates) would moderate this impact. By construction, the beneﬁt ratio does not affect
the results from 2030.
Under the central scenario (which, we should remind that does not include the po-
tential effects of the on-going social security reform), the contributory public pension sys-
tem will register a deﬁcit from 2024 onwards. As it is illustrated in Figure 5, the pension
reserve fund will be capable to ﬁnance the deﬁcit up to 2037. From that point, the system
would not be self-ﬁnanced, demanding reforms and/or transfers from the other govern-
ment administrations. The extreme scenarios complete the picture.
3.2 Comparison with previous recent projections
As we can see in Figure 6, these results are in line with the latest ofﬁcial projections (Min-
isterio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, 2005 and Economic Policy Committee, 2006), and
somewhat lower for the central scenario than two recent independent ones (Balmaseda,
Melguizo and Taguas, 2006 and Rojas, Jimeno and Puente, 2008).13 However, these dif-
ferences can be mostly explained by differences in the demographic, macroeconomic and
13 ProjectionsinFigure6differinassumptions, pensioncategoriesand, sometimes, evenintheperiodanalyzed.
Therefore, numbers should be interpreted with caution. Our high and low scenario do not incude short-term or

























Figure 5: Public pension expenditure and social contributions, 1995-2060 (central
and high/low expenditure scenarios, GDP share).
institutional scenarios. Particularly, with respect to the 2006 European Commission pro-
jection, in spite of a more favourable demographic scenario14, we project a slightly higher
increase (8.5 p.p. vs 7.0 p.p.), due to the institutional framework (both in terms of pension
level and coverage). More important, all the studies share the results about the signiﬁcant
challenge to welfare state ﬁnancing posed by ageing in Spain.
3.3 Revising 1990s projections: What went right?
Our proposal of taking explicitly into account the uncertainty around the baseline can
be tested backwards, examining the evolution of social security accounts since the mid
nineties. In contrast with the projections published a decade ago, both from the gov-
ernment (Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social MTAS, 1995) or from private analysts
(Herce and Pérez-Díaz, 1995 and Barea, González-Páramo and Velarde, 1997, or even more
recently, Alonso and Herce, 2003), social security has been in surplus since 1999 and the
14 Ceteris paribus, according to our estimations, Europop2008 would imply an increase in pension expenditure





















Figure 6: Public pension expenditure projections (GDP share).
Stability Programme extends this surplus, at least, until 2010. We ﬁnd that the exercise
of explaining the projections errors of previous studies, which to our knowledge had not
been made elsewhere, is useful, since these deviations are very often used to discredit
this kind of projection exercises, avoiding the necessary permanent dialogue on pension
reform.
In the mid nineties, after the 1992-1993 recession, it was a time of intense public de-
bate on economic issues, and speciﬁcally on pension reform in Spain. In view of this, all
thepoliticalpartiesapprovedin1995theToledoPacts, whichincludedadiagnosticofpub-
lic pension structural problems and some recommendations for the system reform. Part of
them were actually enacted in 1997 (Ley de consolidación y racionalización del sistema de
Seguridad Social), such as the separation of ﬁnancing sources and the increase in the ac-
tuarial fairness (based on an increase in the number of years in the pension base, and on a
higher penalization for labour careers under 25 years). Afterwards, until the present 2007
reform, legal advances have been modest, even contributing to lower effective retirement
age, as in the 2002 reform (Ley de medidas para el establecimiento de un sistema de jubi-
lación gradual y ﬂexible), which created partial retirement (a type of early retirement that
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Figure 7: Public pension expenditure and social contributions, 1985-2006 (GDP share).
surplus. Figure 7 shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not due to a boom in
social security contributions (actually, roughly constant over GDP), but due to a decrease
in expenditure over GDP.
In addition, focusing on the expenditure side, based on the results of the aforemen-
tioned projections, this good performance is not due neither to the effects of the social
security reform, but to an unexpectedly strong and long-lasting economic growth, driven
by an improved labour market. Applying the aggregate accounting decomposition of pen-
sion expenditure over GDP, in Figure 8 we compare the observed evolution during the last
decade, with the projections15. Expenditure as a percentage of GDP has decreased almost
one point (from 8.5 to 7.6 per cent of GDP). This decrease is driven by a slight decrease in
the take-up ratio (from 1.2 to 1.1) and, mostly, by an outstanding increase in the employ-
ment rate (from 49.8 to 61.2, in National Accounts terms). Population ageing and a higher
beneﬁt ratio contributed to elevate spending. In absence of these two last factors, expendi-
ture would have decreased 2.1 percentage points (1.7 points due to the higher employment
rate).
15 Precise numbers should be taken with caution, since studies differ in the categories of pensions included and
in the participation and unemployment rates deﬁnitions. Besides, since 1996 there have been various method-
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Figure 8: Actual and projected pension expenditure, 1996-2006 (1996-2006 difference, GDP share).
The main deviation of the three projections comes from the much higher contribu-
tion that expected increase of employment rate (approximately one point in the case of
MTAS, 1995 and Herce and Pérez-Díaz, 1995, and 1.6 points in Barea, González-Páramo
and Velarde, 1997). Additionally, there was a signiﬁcant underestimation of the evolu-
tion of the beneﬁt ratio in the two independent studies (Herce and Pérez-Díaz, 1995 set
it almost constant, and Barea, González-Páramo and Velarde, 1997 even projected a de-
crease). However, when this factor is decomposed in its two components, all the deviation
stems from a lower than expected productivity growth (0.4 per year vs. 1.2 in Herce and
Pérez-Díaz, 1995, and 2.8 in Barea, González-Páramo and Velarde, 1997), and not from a
higher average pension level. In both cases, results support the view that Spain has beneﬁt
from an outstanding supply shock, in terms of participation rate, due to immigration ﬂows
(that also contributed to the lower than expected dependency ratio) and to higher women
labour participation. This has led to a labour intensive growth pattern, which explains the
decrease of unemployment rates and the productivity slowdown.
In summary, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the current social security sur-
plus in Spain does not seem to be explained neither by a extraordinary boom in revenues
(which are almost constant over GDP), nor by lower pension levels due to the 1997 re-PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 20
form. On the contrary, it can be explained by a great supply shock, which affected both
the demographic and, mostly, the macroeconomic variables (participation and unemploy-
ment). We believe that if some intervals for these variables had been set in the projections
(in line with the procedure proposed in this section), the debate would have been more
constructive.
4. Indicators and transparency: policy implications
As we have stated in the introduction, there is a substantial asymmetry between the aca-
demic debate on the challenges of the pension system and the knowledge of the median
voter about this issue. In some occasions even, the attempts to extend the academic de-
bate to the public opinion are not well understood, giving place to the allegation made
by some politicians or by other economic agents that such attempts only provoke unnec-
essary worries in the society about the future solvency of the welfare state. For all these
reasons, economists should be encouraged to improve their communication strategy in or-
der to improve the society’s understanding of the implications of ageing on government
budgets. In fact, information and knowledge is a necessary but not a sufﬁcient condition to
increase the support of a reforming agenda. In a provocative paper, Sinn and Uebelmesser
(2003) predicted that informed German voters would support the transition to a partially
funded pension system only until 2014 since, after that year, gerontocracy would rule and
the age of the median voter would impede any reform.16
The ﬁrst element in a new communication strategy should be to make explicit and
clear the objectives of an exercise addressing pension system projections. The society will
be more receptive and sympathetic to those studies that make explicit from the beginning
that their main aim is to contribute to the strengthening and the reinforcement of the wel-
fare state, preventing some of the problems that may arise in the future. Taking as given
that modern societies with well founded welfare states are particularly interested in satis-
fying their demand of social policies, the projection of possible futures imbalances in the
pension system should not be understood as jeopardizing the system itself. On the con-
trary, they should be seen as an attempt to anticipate the correct policies aimed at making
16 However, a branch in the political economy literature on social security has departed from this median voter
hypothesis, suggesting the need to control also for the preferences of other population groups (see Galasso and
Profeta, 2002 for a survey). In this generalized context, the effect of ageing on social expenditure would depend
on the net impact of two opposite effects: on the one hand, the increasing demand of the elderly (the traditional
positive political economy effect), and on the other, the attempts of the young and working-age population to
avoid it, given the associated higher tax burden (a negative economic effect). Empirical evidence for the OECD
suggests that the ﬁrst effect dominates (Disney, 2007), although it is decreasing over time (Sanz and Velázquez,
2007).PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 21
the system less vulnerable to future developments. Besides, a proper anticipation of the
challenges also reduces the burden of the needed measures since their implementation is
spread over a longer period of years.
The second element in order to improve the communication strategy is to agree a
common set of indicators about the pension system outlook. These indicators could be
based on ﬁve basic requirements: simplicity, transparency, credibility, publicity and pe-
riodicity. Unsurprisingly, these characteristics are also required in the implementation of
ﬁscal rules such the Stability and Growth Pact, and they have attracted the attention of
many authors (see, for example, Buiter, 2003, or Buti, Eijfﬁnger and Franco, 2003, and
the references therein and, particularly, Franco, Marino and Zotteri, 2006, in the case of
pensions). Simplicity ensures that the indicators used to assess the outlook of the system
are easily understood by the public opinion. Transparency implies that the methodology
is easily reproducible and that the sensitivity of indicators to changes in the hypothesis
about future scenarios is well known. The credibility of the institutions responsible for the
elaboration of the projections and the indicators is a key aspect in order to increase the so-
ciety receptiveness to the results. In some cases, external reviewing may be convenient.
Finally, publicity and periodicity of the indicators will improve the communication strat-
egy over time as the public opinion get accustomed about the usefulness of this kind of
information, not implying necessarily the need of a reform every time the indicators are
published. In the last two decades, projections of the Spanish pension system by ofﬁcial
institutions were only made to set up the reform of the system (in 1984 and 1995, before
the 1985 and 1997 reforms). At the present moment, there is the commitment of presenting
these projections every three years to the European Commission. However, it would be
convenient to update, at least nationally, the set of indicator every year, since monitoring
the system continuously is a need in complex and ever-changing societies, even if reforms
were not required.
Besides, the communication strategy will improve also if the indicators are accom-
panied by measures of the uncertainty surrounding the projection exercises. The crucial
point here is that the forecast errors of past scenarios are usually used to diminish the cred-
ibility of pension system projections into the future, as we showed in the previous section.
Therefore, to prevent this kind of critique, it is convenient to make clear from the begin-
ning that the projections are subject to forecasts errors (actually, they do not mean to be
forecasts, but projections), and that, even taking into account the existing uncertainty, the
projections under different assumptions may shed light about the challenges of the pen-
sion system. For this purpose, it should be convenient to compute conﬁdence intervalsPROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 22
around a baseline scenario based on alternative procedures.17
A ﬁrst possibility is to obtain the conﬁdence intervals based on stochastic simula-
tion of the different variables which affect the baseline. This approach has been followed,
among others, by Ahn, Alonso-Meseguer and García (2005), Lee, Miller and Anderson
(2004), the US Social Security Trustees and the CBO. To obtain probabilistic intervals, it is
necessary to make some statistical assumptions concerning the rates of growth of popula-
tion, productivity and many other variables used in the projection, and obtaining the con-
ﬁdence interval around the baseline scenario using, for example, bootstrapping methods.
Although, in principle, this approach may be comprehensive of the uncertainty around
the projection, it is very demanding in its computational details and, at the end of the day,
is very dependent on the distributions assumed for the different parameters of the model.
A second approach to represent the uncertainty around the projection is to assume
low and high expenditure scenarios for the demographic, socio-economic and institutional
hypothesis, as we have done in the previous section. This allows obtaining also fan charts,
stemming not from the statistical properties of the series, but from our different scenarios.
This procedure is simpler and, at the same time, more transparent since it is very easy to
analyze the sensitivity of the projection and indicators to changes in the priors.
Although many indicators may satisfy the above requirements, in this paper we
focus on two of them. The ﬁrst indicator forecasts the pension system balance for the next
25 years, complemented by the information about the capabilities of the reserve fund (in
case it exists, as in Spain) to ensure the self-ﬁnancing of the system in case of deﬁcits.
The second one computes the actuarial balance up to 2060 (determined by the population
projections horizon) of the public pension system and, eventually, the required revenue
and expenditure adjustments.18
Figure 9 represents the graphical medium-term indicator for the central scenario
(that is, the one based on the intermediate assumptions in demography, macroeconomics
17 Actually, these extensions are increasingly incorporated even in more complex methodologies. For instance,
Fehr and Habbermann (2006) combine stochastic population forecasts and the overlapping-generation approach
in the evaluation of pension reforms in Germany, to account explicitly for the uncertainty arising from future
population
18 We are aware that these indicators, in line with the traditional ”crossover dates” and ”fund exhaustion” used
in the US, were criticized by Gokhale and Smetters (2006). According to these authors, the 75 years horizon pub-
lished by US social security administration is misleading and biased against potential reforms, so they advocate
for the inﬁnite horizon ﬁgures. We defend our approach in two ways. First, demographic projections, avail-
able only up to 2060, show that ageing in Spain might top in our time horizon (between 2052 and 2054). And,
secondly, we ﬁnd that publishing these indicators for Spain, as is done in the US, would be, at least, a step for-
ward in order to improve the knowledge of citizens about their pension system and to set a public debate with
























Figure 9: Medium-term indicator (central and high/low expenditure scenarios, GDP share).
and pension levels), as well as for the high and low expenditure scenarios (which combine
Demo 1, Macro 1 and Institut 1, and Demo 3, Macro 3 and Institut 3, respectively, named
scenarios 1 and 7). It is a selective zoom of the previous Figure 5. Social security contri-
butions will be lower than contributory public pension expenditures in the time horizon
considered (precisely, in 14 to 25 years), signalling the need of a debate on a reform agenda.
The pension reserve fund, which could exceed 21 per cent of GDP in the central scenario,
allows measures to be gradually phased-in.
In the long run, the capability of the pension system to be self-ﬁnanced should be
evaluated in actuarial terms. We assume a real discount factor of 3 per cent (as the Con-
gressional Budget Ofﬁce, 2004, or the Committee on Monetary, Financial and Balance of
Payments Statistics, 2008). Figure 10 contains the projection until 2060 of pension expen-
ditures vs. total revenues (including not only social contributions, but also pension fund
interests), for the same three scenarios, in 2007 present value, which cover the whole plau-
sible range of results (central and scenarios 1 and 7), according to our assumptions.
This projection implies that debt, in present terms, would amount 66.2 per cent
of 2007 GDP (1.6 per cent of annual GDP from 2007 to 2060), with a wide interval from
￿113.4 per cent to even a surplus that amounts to 21.6 per cent of 2007 GDP. An increase














Figure 10: Long-term indicator (central and high/low expenditure scenarios, GDP
share, 2007 present value).
in expenditure of 0.5 per cent, could balance the system up to 2060. The same ﬁgures are
calculated for the alternative scenarios, and summarized in Table 3.
5. Conclusions
Medium and long-term projections of public expenditures are crucial in modern societies
in order to anticipate the futures challenges of the public sector. Given its relative size on
public spending, these projections are particularly important in the case of public pension
expenditures, as it is been acknowledged in the on-going redeﬁnition of the budgetary
medium term objectives in the European Union or in the new Satellite National Accounts
proposed by the ECB and the European Commission. However, in many cases these pro-
jections are not well understood by the public opinion, who ignores many aspects about
the functioning of public pension systems, and are very often watered down under the ar-
gument that the projection errors made in the past suggest that this kind of exercises is of
limited value.
In this paper we have suggested a set of indicators about the future performance
of the Spanish public pension system and a suitable method of representing their uncer-PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 25
Table 3. Summary indicators of the pension system.
(Central and high/low expenditure scenarios scenarios)
High-expenditure Central Low-Expenditure
Key facts
Year Expenditure > Revenues 2020 2024 2031
Year Fund=0 2032 2038 2052
Accumulated debt until 2060
(annual GDP share) -3,4% -1,6% 0,5%
(2007 GDP share) -113,4% -66,2% 21,6%
Necessary adjustment (from 2009)
Revenues (annual) 1,4% 0,6% -0,2%
Expenditure (annual) -1,1% -0,5% 0,1%
Note: Not including the short-term economic uncertainty factor
Source: Own elaboration
tainty, in order to improve the communication to the public opinion and to prevent future
criticisms about their forecast accuracy. We have argued that simple, transparent, cred-
ible, public, and periodically updated indicators, which take explicitly into account the
uncertainty about future demographic, economic and institutional developments, may
contribute to improve the debate on the policies and to support governments in the con-
tinuous reforms needed to strengthen the pension system.
To illustrate our proposals, we have taken the Spanish public pension system as
workhorse. Spain is a particularly interesting case since the social security system has
been in surplus for nine consecutive years, in contrast to the projections made just a decade
ago. We have shown that these projections errors from 1996 to 2006 can be explained by
an unexpected favourable performance of the labour market, mainly due to the effects of
immigration. Despite the current favourable situation, Spain will face one of the high-
est increases in public expenditure among EU countries due to ageing, as shown by all
the indicators we have proposed, even taking into account the demographic, economic
and institutional uncertainty surrounding the projections. This expected increase in pen-
sion expenditures encourages fostering a debate on the challenges of the Spanish public
pension system in good times better than in bad times, in order to have a wider mar-
gin of manoeuvre, given that reforms have been less far-reaching than in other European
economies, notably Germany, Italy or Sweden.PROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 26
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7. Additional tables
Table A1. Main socio-economic assumptions
Central scenario
2006 2010 2030 2060
Participation rate
Total 72,2% 75,6% 75,2% 79,7%
Female 61,8% 66,9% 68,9% 77,6%
Male 82,4% 84,0% 81,3% 81,8%
Unemployment rate
Total 8,3% 7,7% 6,5% 4,1%
Female 11,4% 10,4% 8,1% 4,0%
Male 6,1% 5,6% 5,1% 4,1%
Source: INE and own elaboration
Table A2. Per capita income growth decomposition, 1996-2060
Central scenario, average annual growth, p.p.
GDP/Lpop GDP/L L/LS Ls/L16-64 L16-64/Lpop GDP Lpop
1996-2006 2,6 0,4 0,4 1,7 0,1 3,7 1,2
2007-2010 1,5 0,9 -0,2 1,2 -0,3 3,3 1,8
2010-2015 1,2 1,3 -0,1 0,4 -0,4 2,3 1,1
2015-2020 1,4 1,5 0,1 0,0 -0,2 2,1 0,7
2020-2025 1,4 1,5 0,1 0,0 -0,2 1,7 0,4
2025-2030 1,3 1,5 0,1 0,1 -0,4 1,5 0,2
2030-2035 1,2 1,5 0,1 0,3 -0,7 1,3 0,1
2035-2040 1,1 1,5 0,1 0,5 -0,9 1,2 0,1
2040-2045 1,1 1,5 0,1 0,6 -1,0 1,2 0,0
2045-2050 1,4 1,5 0,1 0,5 -0,6 1,3 -0,1
2050-2055 1,8 1,5 0,1 0,3 -0,1 1,5 -0,2
2055-2060 2,0 1,5 0,1 0,2 0,2 1,6 -0,3
Source: INE and own elaborationPROJECTING PENSION EXPENDITURES IN SPAIN 29
Table A3. Institutional assumptions. Recent developments and projections (I)
Take-up ratio: Lpens / L+65
Observed Central MTAS (2005) EPC (2006)
1996 1,19
2006 1,14
2010 1,13 1,10 1,18
2020 1,10 1,09 1,16
2030 1,08 1,02 1,14
2040 1,05 0,96 1,08
2050 1,03 0,93 1,00
2060 1,00 --- ---
Average 1,15 1,06 1,02 1,11
Source: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales and own elaboration
Table A4. Institutional assumptions. Recent developments and projections (II)
Average real pension increase (Gpens/pLpens)
Observed Central MTAS (2005) EPC (2006)
1996 2,10
2006 2,06
2010 1,85 2,30 1,37
2020 1,77 1,67 1,90
2030 1,68 1,80 1,90
2040 1,77 1,70 1,70
2050 1,69 1,50 1,42
2060 1,56 --- ---
Average 1,88 1,72 1,79 1,67
Source: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales and own elaboration